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S E C R E T THE HAGUE 003100

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [AF](#) [NL](#) [EUN](#)

SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING DUTCH
CONCERNS ABOUT ISAF III

REF: A. THE HAGUE 3054

[1](#)B. THE HAGUE 3037

[1](#)C. THE HAGUE 2988

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d).

[1](#)1. (S) SUMMARY: Senior Dutch military and diplomatic contacts say that Defense Minister Kamp feels he has not yet received sufficient assurances from the U.S. to proceed with a proposed Dutch troop deployment to Oruzgan under ISAF Stage III. Kamp hopes to talk directly to SecDef Rumsfeld to resolve outstanding Dutch concerns prior to a planned November 18 Cabinet discussion. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (S) Dutch Defense Minister Kamp remains undecided whether to recommend to Cabinet a deployment of Dutch forces in Oruzgan province in Afghanistan under ISAF STAGE III because of continuing concerns regarding neighboring Zabol province and the two northern Oruzgan firebases (ref a). That is the message Charge, POLCOUNS, and DATT each received on November 16 from Pieter de Gooijer (Deputy POLDIR, MFA), Robert de Groot (Chief of Security Affairs Department, MFA) and General Eikelboom (Chief of Operations, MOD) respectively. All Dutch interlocutors stressed that Minister Kamp had been disappointed by the results of Pace-Berlijn talks in Brussels over the last 48 hours, and intended to call SecDef personally to request reconsideration of the U.S. position. Kamp is still planning to meet with Foreign Minister Bot on November 17 to consider whether and how to initiate discussion of the deployment decision in Cabinet on November [1](#)18.

[1](#)3. (S) According to de Groot, the Dutch are satisfied with the results of their discussions with partners (UK, Canada, and Australia), SACEUR, and the Afghan government. De Groot added that he expected the results of the intelligence review to be more "nuanced" than the MIVD's initial report, making a Dutch deployment appear more "doable" than previously. But, he stressed, the outstanding requests for U.S. forces (about 80) to remain embedded with the Afghan National Army in Oruzgan and for a maneuver battalion (about 200 troops) to remain in Zabol are "show stoppers" for Kamp. De Gooijer similarly stressed that without movement on these two requests, Kamp would be unlikely to make a positive recommendation to Cabinet to proceed.

[1](#)4. (S) COMMENT: In addition to the proposed Kamp-Rumsfeld call, we understand that Dutch Ambassador van Eenennaam may reach out to senior State, NSC, and Pentagon interlocutors to underscore Dutch concerns. The Dutch have stressed repeatedly to us that Kamp's considerations are as much political as military; they have also emphasized that the MFA and uniformed military want the deployment to go forward but are unable or unwilling to challenge Kamp's decision. END COMMENT.

BLAKEMAN